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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah R. App. Pro., and Section 78-2-
2(3)(j)/ Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. The judgment became 
final by the Order denying Appellant7s Rule 59 motion entered on 
September 4, 2002. Notice of Appeal was filed on October 2, 2002. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR, AND STANDARD OF, REVIEW 
ISSUES PRESENTED: Did the trial court err in granting Allstate's 
summary judgment motion and denying Black's partial summary 
judgment motion, and did the trial court further err in ruling 
that the judgment in favor of Allstate and against Black was with 
prejudice? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: As to the summary judgment rulings, the 
standard is one of correction of error, with no deference given 
to the trial court's rulings. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Statef 
779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). As to the issue of with or without 
prejudice, the standard is also correction of error, no 
deference. Beaver v. Qwest, Inc., 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001); 
Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc., 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 
1986). 
RECORD CITATION: R. 318-319, 333-334; R. 398-408, 418-426, 435-
437. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellant's counsel is unaware of any Constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of, or of central importance to, 
1 
this appeal, and is unaware of any controlling case authority as 
to the particular situation arising in this case. However, 
Appellant Relieves the issues in this case are governed by the 
principles set out in Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 701 P. 2d 795 
(Utah 1985), and the numerous other cases dealing with the duties 
attendant to insurance contracts. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involved claims by Appellant Black against 
his insurer, Allstate, for breach of contract, including breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and trial 
court co-defendant Gallagher, for property damages. The claim 
against Gallagher arose out of an automobile accident involving 
Black and Gallagher on or about April 12, 1996. The claim against 
Allstate arose out of the alleged breach of its contractual 
duties to Appellant Black, which duties flowed from Appellant 
Black's automobile insurance policy with Allstate, including the 
duty to defend and to deal fairly and in good faith. 
Appellant Black filed this lawsuit on December 31, 
1998, R. 1^ -7, and defendants Allstate and Gallagher filed 
separate answers. R. 8-13, 14-17. After some discovery was made, 
Respondent Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment, R. 22-
35, which Appellant opposed, R. 36-48, and Appellant Black filed 
both a partial summary judgment motion, R. 299-313, and a motion 
to compel, R. 84, 102-185, which Respondent Allstate opposed, R. 
191-198, 186-190. [Note: At the hearing on the respective 
motions, tfte court noted that Black's motion and principal 
memorandum supporting his partial summary judgment motion was not 
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in the file, so Black's counsel provided the court with copies. 
The copies are at R. 85-99, the originals are at R. 299-313.] 
After a hearing on the respective summary judgment motions, the 
court (Judge Frederick presiding) made a minute entry ruling 
granting Allstate's motion and denying Black's motion "for the 
reasons specified in Allstate's supporting pleadings and as 
articulated at oral argument." R. 316-317. Appellant Black 
objected to Allstate's proposed Order on the basis that it should 
expressly state it to be without prejudice, based on Appellant's 
belief from the hearing proceedings that the trial court's 
rulings were grounded on the belief that Black's claim against 
Allstate was not ripe for adjudication until the issue of 
liability between Black and Gallagher was decided. Black also 
asserted that the Order should contain a brief written statement 
of the grounds for the court's rulings. R. 318-319. The court 
denied the Objection, R. 331-332, and signed the original Order, 
R. 3 3 3-3 34, and an Order denying the Objection, R. 335-3 36. 
The case as against trial court co-defendant Gallagher 
then proceeded to a bench trial before the Honorable Stephen 
Henriod on March 26, 2002. R. 380. Judge Henriod issued his 
Memorandum Decision on March 27, 2002, which found Appellant 
Black not negligent and defendant Gallagher 100% negligent and 
entirely at fault for the accident and property damages claimed. 
R. 383-389. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
were entered on April 16, 2002. R. 392-397. The judgment against 
Gallagher has been satisfied, and Gallagher is not a party to 
this appeal. 
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On April 26, 2002, Appellant Black then moved the court 
alter or amend the judgment as to Allstate, R. 398-408, 418-426, 
which was opposed by Allstate, R. 411-417. Judge Henriod passed 
the matter back to Judge Frederick, R. 429-442, who denied the 
motion to alter or amend in a minute entry ruling, R. 433-434. 
An Order denying the motion was entered on September 4, 2002, 
which expressly asserted that the summary judgment in favor of 
Allstate and against Black was with prejudice based upon Utah law 
that as a third-party claimant, Black could not maintain a direct 
cause of action against Allstate, R. 435-436. 
Appellant Black filed his Notice of Appeal on October 
2, 2002. R. 438-439. 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
On April 12, 1996, Appellant Black was traveling north 
on West Temple Street, approaching 3 300 South Street in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. R. 302. Black entered the intersection of 3300 
South and West Temple in the left-turn lane on a green light and 
stopped in the intersection to wait for traffic to clear. R. 302. 
Although it was raining at the time, the traffic light was 
clearly visible at all times. R. 46. After the light turned 
yellow to north-south traffic, plaintiff's vehicle was visible to 
southbound traffic on West Temple and stopped in the intersection 
waiting to complete its left-hand turn, while Gallagher's vehicle 
was southbound on West Temple, going approximately thirty (30) 
miles per hour, and a considerable distance from the 
intersection, perhaps up to 50 yards. R. 46. After the traffic 
signal turned red to West Temple traffic, a third vehicle which 
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was a few car lengths ahead of the Gallagher vehicle ran the red 
light immediately in front of Black's vehicle, and Gallagher 
appeared to hesitate briefly, R. 46. As cross traffic on 3300 
South began to proceed on their green light and Black began to 
complete his left turn, the Gallagher vehicle ran the red light 
and smashed into the Black vehicle. R. 46. 
According to the sole known independent witness, Roger 
Anderson, (1) Black had no opportunity to avoid the accident, and 
acted as any driver would have under the same circumstances 
(i.e., reasonably), (2) that if the Gallagher vehicle had not hit 
Black's vehicle it would have hit the cross tarffic on 3 3 00 
South, (3) that the Gallagher vehicle did not appear to apply any 
brakes until immediately before the impact, and (4) that the 
Gallagher vehicle certainly could have stopped before reaching 
the intersection. R. 47. (Anderson was traveling southbound on 
West Temple next to the Gallagher vehicle at the same speed, and, 
having begun braking in a normal fashion when the first 
southbound vehicle ran the red light, was able to stop before 
reaching the intersection. R. 45-47.) 
Both the Black and Gallagher vehicles were insured by 
Allstate Insurance Company. Black had only minimum no-fault 
liability coverage, while Gallagher had liability and collision 
(or comprehensive) coverage. R. 37, 301. Allstate proceeded to 
adjust both Black's claim against the Gallagher policy and 
Gallagher's claim against the Black policy together. R. 3 01. In 
its "investigation" of the accident, Allstate failed to contact 
the sole independent witness to the accident, Roger Anderson. R. 
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37, 47. In spite of conceding that Gallagher had clearly run the 
red light, Allstate determined in its claims adjustment process 
that Black was primarily at fault for the accident. R. 303, 308, 
313. 
After failing to convince Allstate of their error in 
their adjustment determination, Black filed this lawsuit aginst 
Allstate for breach of its contract with Black, specifically its 
duty to defend Black against the Gallagher claim and the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and against Gallagher 
for liability for the damages suffered in the accident. R. 1-7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Black contends in this appeal that the trial court 
erred in granting Allstate's summary judgment motion, in denying 
Black's partial summary judgment motion, and in determining that 
its grant of Allstate's summary judgment motion was with 
prejudice. 
As to granting Allstate's summary judgment motion, 
Black argues that no interpretation of the grounds for Allstate's 
motion were valid under the undisputed facts of the case, with 
the possibly arguable exception of the ground of lack of 
ripeness, and that in that event the judgment could not be held 
to be "with prejudice." 
As to denying Black's partial summary judgment motion, 
Black argues that under the undisputed facts before the court, 
Black was entitled to a determination that Allstate's 
determination of fault in its adjustment process was erroneous as 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ALLSTATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Although Allstate's argument in its memoranda in 
support of its summary judgment motion is not a model of clarity, 
it appears that Allstate's grounds can be summarized under three 
basic theories: 1. Declaring Black's claim against Allstate to be 
an improper third-party claim under the Gallagher policy 
(Allstate's mischaractization of Black's claim is primarily 
argued in its reply memorandum), 2. Alleging that Black cannot 
sue Allstate until after obtaining a liability judgment against 
Gallagher, i.e. lack of ripeness, and 3. Black's claim against 
Allstate is barred under the provisions of his policy contract 
with Allstate. 
A, Charactization of Black's Claim Against Allstate. This 
basis for Allstate's summary judgment motion is only hinted at in 
its initial memorandum in support of its motion, but is more 
expressly stated in its reply memorandum. Black believes that 
this ground is simply unsupportable under the facts and pleadings 
herein, and is a gross mischaracterization of Black's claim 
against Allstate as pled herein. Allstate essentially argues that 
what Black is "really" doing is suing Allstate as a third-party 
claimant against the Gallagher policy. This is completely untrue. 
A review of the Complaint herein reveals that Black's 
claim against Allstate is based on its alleged breach of its own 
contract with Black, specifically its duty to defend Black 
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against the Gallagher claim (which includes duties to diligently 
investigate the claim against Black, fairly evaluate it, and 
reasonably reject or settle it), along with the duty to deal 
fairly and in good faith. Beck v. Farmers Ins, Exch,, 701 P. 2d 
795, 801 (Utah 1985). Black believes that he has adequately 
stated a claim against Allstate based on his own contract with 
it, not as a third-party claimant against the Gallagher policy. 
Some confusion arises in fact situations such as 
occurred in this case by the somewhat inconsistent and 
potentially confusing use of the terms "first-party" and "third-
party" in these insurance matters. On one hand, the use of the 
term "first-party" frequently refers to any situation of the 
insured making a claim against his own policy, as opposed to a 
situation where a non-insured, or "third-party" with no 
contractual privity, makes a claim against the insured's 
liability coverage. On the other hand, both terms are used under 
the Beck analysis to refer to two distinct situations which can 
arise as to an insured's claims against his insurer under the 
provisions of the insured's own policy. One type, referred to as 
"first-party" in Beck, concerns where the insured herself files a 
claim with her own insurer under her own policy coverage. See, 
e.g., Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 480 P.2d 739 
(Utah 1971). The other type, referred to as "third-party" in 
Beck, concerns claims of an insured against her own insurer for 
breaching its duty to defend the insured against claims made by 
third parties against the insured. See, e.g., Ammerman v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967). Black's claim against 
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Allstate herein is of this type, and entitles Black to recover 
against Allstate in tort, not just in contract, because of the 
fiduciary nature of the relationship. Beck, supra, at p. 799. 
Thus, Black's claim against Allstate herein arises out 
of his own contractual relationship with Allstate, and Allstate's 
attempts to mischaracterize it as a "third-party" claim against 
the Gallagher policy must be rejected. 
B, Allstate's Policy Provision Defenses. The second apparent 
ground for Allstate's summary judgment motion is provisions in 
Black's policy, commonly referred to as the "duty to defend" and 
"no direct action" clauses. 
Under the "duty to defend" clause, Allstate asserts 
that because of this clause in its contract with Black, it "may 
settle any claim or suit that it believes is proper." However, 
this covenant to defend Black clearly does not give Allstate 
carte blanche authority in adjusting and settling claims against 
Black's liability policy. Allstate's suggestion that this clause 
gave it unfettered discretion to make whatever decision in 
adjusting the Gallagher claim against Black's liability coverage 
is unsupportable. If that were true, there would be no Beck 
"third-party" cases at all. Beck, supra; Ammerman, supra. What 
the covenant to defend the insured against non-insured claims did 
do is place a heightened, fiduciary duty upon Allstate to see 
that Black's best interests were protected. Beck, supra at p. 
799. It is this contract provision that allows Black to sue not 
just in contract, but in tort. Id. It cannot be used as a shield 
by Allstate against Black's claim that it breached that very part 
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of his contract with Allstate. 
The second contractual provision of Black's policy 
cited by Allstate is the "no direct action" clause. However, this 
provision is simply a bar to any third-party claimants against 
Black's liability policy from suing Allstate directly in the 
first instance as to liability for damages from an accident with 
Black. It cannot be a bar to Black's claims against Allstate for 
tort or breach of contract for failing to live up to the duties 
it owed Black as the insured under his own policy. 
Furthermore, Allstate's argument that its policy 
provisions bar Black from bringing this action appears to be in 
conflict with limitations of the Utah Insurance Code which state 
that an insurance policy may not, among other things, "provide 
that no action may be brought, subject to permissible arbitration 
provisions in contracts." Section 31A-21-313(3)(c), Ut. Code Ann. 
C. Ripeness Issue. Allstate asserts that Black "has no right 
to sue Allstate until after a judgment is obtained against 
Gallagher—if and when one is ever obtained." This would be true 
under Utah law, as a result of the "no direct action" clause, if 
Black was in fact suing Allstate solely because of a denial of 
his claim against the Gallagher policy. However, because Black's 
claim against Allstate is based on its breach of his own contract 
with Allstate, including the duties to defend and deal fairly and 
in good faith, the "no direct action" clause is inapplicable. 
Support, Hebert v. Guastella, 409 So.2d 375 (La.App. 1982). Black 
is unaware of any legal precedent in Utah as to this particular 
issue, that is, whether an insured may sue in the same action 
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both an alleged tortfeasor for liability for an accident and the 
insured's own insurer for breaching its contract in wrongfully 
acceding to that alleged tortfeasor's liability claim against the 
insured's policy. Black believes there are no significant policy 
reasons to prevent such a combined lawsuit in light of the 
court's ability to bifurcate the claims under Rule 42, Utah R. 
Civ. Pro. The trial court herein, at the hearing on the parties' 
respective summary judgment motions, seemed to focus only on this 
ripeness issue, believing that Black would first have to obtain 
judgment against Gallagher as to liability for the accident 
before proceeding against Allstate. See, transcript of the April 
3, 2000, hearing at R. 444 and Addendum A of this Appellant's 
Brief. 
It is Black's position that his claim against Allstate 
was, in fact, ripe because, as between Black and Allstate, the 
facts were undisputed and Allstate's liability determination made 
in its adjustment of Black's and Gallagher's claims together was 
erroneous as a matter of law. See, Point III, infra. Even if this 
Court agrees that Black's claim against Allstate could not 
proceed until the case against Gallagher was resolved, the trial 
court could have simply ordered the bifurcation of the claims 
rather than granting Allstate's motion for summary judgment. 
Further, even assuming that this Court upholds the trial court's 
decision to grant Allstate's summary judgment motion based on a 
lack of ripeness, that judgment could not have been "with 
prejudice." See, Point II, infra. 
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POINT II 
LACK OF RIPENESS CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR TOSSING 
OUT BLACK'S CLAIM AGAINST ALLSTATE WITH PREJUDICE 
Appellant Black believes that the grant of Allstate's 
motion for summary judgment was undoubtedly erroneous if based on 
either (a) mischaracterizing Black's claim against Allstate as an 
improper "third party" claim against Allstate under the Gallagher 
policy, or (b) the contractual "duty to defend" and/or "no direct 
action" provisions of the Allstate policy. In the event that this 
Court decides that the trial court did not err in granting 
Allstate's motion due to lack of ripeness, then the judgment in 
favor of Allstate and against Black cannot have been "with 
prejudice" as stated in the Order denying Black's motion to alter 
or amend the judgment with respect to Allstate. 
Because summary judgment prevents litigants from fully 
presenting their case to the court, courts are, and should be, 
reluctant to invoke that remedy. Brandt v. Springville Banking 
Co. , 353 P.2d 460 (Utah 1960). The rules of procedure encourage 
the adjudication of disputes on their merits. Bonneville Tower v. 
Thompson Michie Assoc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). It is 
readily apparent that granting summary judgment because of a lack 
of ripeness is not an "on the merits" determination, but merely a 
finding that a prerequisite to addressing the merits of the claim 
is lacking, which abates the determination of the claim on the 
merits. Id. Therefor, if the trial court's ruling against Black 
was based on the absence of a judicial determination of the claim 
against Gallagher, it must be without prejudice, and the court's 
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entry of an Order to the contrary is reversible error. Support, 
Beaver v. Qwest, Inc., 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001); Bonneville 
Tower, supra. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BLACK'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE, UNDER THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS BEFORE THE COURT, ALLSTATE'S 
DECISION AS TO LIABILITY IN ITS ADJUSTMENT 
PROCESS WAS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Although it may be suggested that this issue was 
rendered moot by the trial court's bench trial decision finding 
Black not negligent and Gallagher 100% negligent in causing the 
accident which gave rise to this lawsuit, Black believes it still 
has significance with regard to the question of whether his claim 
against Allstate was ripe for adjudication. This is because of 
the somewhat unusual situation that although Gallagher, in 
defense of Black's claim against him for tort liability for 
Black's property damage arising from the accident, maintained 
that he did not run the red light, as to Black's claim against 
Allstate, Allstate conceded the fact that Gallagher did run the 
red light and that the facts of the accident were not in dispute. 
See, Hamblin letter, Exhibit A of Black's Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at R.308; and the failure 
of Allstate to controvert any of Black's alleged undisputed 
facts, found at R. 301-303, in its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 191-198, as 
Black pointed out in his reply memorandum, R. 199-204. 
Thus, as between Black and Allstate, the undisputed 
facts of the accident were as set forth in Black's memorandum 
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supporting his motion for partial summary judgment, R. 301-303. 
Black's position is that under those undisputed facts, 
Allstate's adjustment determination of fault was erroneous as a 
matter of law, under the following analysis as set out in Black's 
principal memorandum supporting his partial summary judgment 
motion, R. 303-307: 
Under well accepted principles of negligence and rules 
of traffic regulation, it must be concluded that not only was 
Allstate's determination of liability on the claims of Black and 
Gallagher contrary to common sense, but erroneous as a matter of 
law. 
Every determination of the issue of the negligence of a 
party to an automobile accident, or any liability claim based in 
the law of negligence, begins with the determination of what 
duty, if any is owed to the other party. Owens By and Through 
Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989). Such a 
determination is a question of law to be decided by the court. 
Truiillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778 (Utah 1992). Without a 
duty, there can be no negligence as a matter of law, and summary 
judgment is appropriate. Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt 
Lake City, 919 P.2d 586 (Utah 1996). Under the law and rules of 
traffic regulation and the facts of this case, Black neither owed 
nor breached any particular duty to Gallagher, and therefore was 
not negligent as a matter of law, and, consequently, Allstate's 
determination of 60% negligence on the part of Black in its 
evaluation of the claims of Black and Gallagher was erroneous as 
a matter of law. 
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It is a well-settled principle of traffic law and 
regulation that motorists driving on streets protected at 
intersections by traffic lights are justified in assuming that a 
driver approaching such intersection understands the signals and 
won't cross against them, and therefore need not anticipate that 
a driver will enter the intersection in violation of a stop 
signal. Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice § 114.111 (3d ed. 
1965) (hereinafter "Blashfield"). In other words, persons having 
the right of way are entitled to rely on the assumption that 
other drivers will obey traffic signs or signals and not run a 
red light or stop sign. Kelbaugh v. Mills, 671 A.2d 41, 45 (Md. 
App. 1996); Cassidv v. Valenti, 621 N.Y.A.D. 405 (1995); Morgan 
v. Braasch, 446 S.E.2d 746 (Ga.App. 1994); Horton v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., 641 So.2d 993, 999 (La.App. 1994); Smith v. Brooks, 575 
A.2d 926, 934 (Pa.Super. 1990); Vaccaro v. Sports & Imports, 
Inc., 539 So.2d 989 (La.App. 1989). Utah has also recognized this 
basic principle in its case law. Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 
1336-1337 (Utah 1993)(Rule that left-turning vehicle must yield 
right of way to approaching vehicles which constitute immediate 
hazard is inapplicable where approaching vehicle is required to 
stop); Smith v. Gallecros, 400 P.2d 570, 572 (Utah 1965); Morris 
v. Christensen, 356 P.2d 34, 35 (Utah 1960); Williams v. ZCMI, 
312 P. 2d 564, 565 (Utah 1957). 
In light of the above proposition, a motorist who is 
turning on a favorable signal, such as plaintiff herein, is not 
negligent with respect to a collision with an oncoming vehicle 
for which the light was then red, as Allstate concedes it was for 
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Gallagher in this case, Blashfield § 114.129. In such 
circumstances, there is no negligence and summary judgment is 
appropriate, as a number of cases have held. Cassidy v. Valenti, 
supra at 406-07 (summary judgment on liability upheld where 
plaintiff making left turn and hit by cross traffic which ran red 
light); Morgan v. Braasch, supra at 748-49 (defendant ran stop 
sign, summary judgment granted plaintiff); Olson v. Parchen, 816 
P.2d 423, 426-27 (Mont. 1991)(question of contributory negligence 
should not be submitted to jury where driver obeying basic rules 
of road didn't see other driver fail to yield right of way, 
because failure to see was not proximate cause of accident, but 
failure to yield was); Dale v. Carroll, 509 So.2d 770, 777 
(La.App.2 1987)(no negligence/no duty at all on party who enters 
intersection on green light vs. party who did not enter on green 
or yellow; entitled to assume other driver would stop 
appropriately); Vender v. Stone, 802 P.2d 606, 608 (Mont. 
1990)(where party was lawfully in intersection waiting to 
complete left-hand turn, other party approaching on cross street 
and colliding with left-turning party was solely responsible for 
accident as a matter of law, even if light had turned green by 
the time cross-traffic party entered intersection); support, 
Dolbercr v. Paltani, 549 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Neb. 1996)(no duty, 
absent exceptional circumstances, for motorist with favored green 
light to anticipate others running red light). 
Under the acknowledged facts of this case, Black was 
lawfully in the intersection attempting to complete his left-hand 
turn after his light turned red, when defendant Gallagher ran his 
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vehicle through the red light well after it had turned red and 
collided with Black's vehicle. As the cases cited above show, 
under such facts there was no duty on the part of Black to 
anticipate and guard against such flagrantly negligent conduct by 
Gallagher, and, as a matter of law, there could be no finding of 
negligence on the part of the Black. The court must therefore 
conclude that Allstate's "liability determination" to the 
contrary was erroneous as a matter of law. There are no facts 
present which would remove this particular accident from the 
clear, well-established rules set forth above. Thus, Allstate's 
determination was not only contrary to common sense, but contrary 
to the law as well. 
Since the trial court was faced with the situation of 
Black and Allstate not disputing the basic facts of the accident, 
and that those facts lead, as a matter of law, to the conclusion 
that the "fault" for the accident was entirely Gallagher's, there 
was simply no need, as to the Black v. Allstate claim, to wait 
for a decision on Black's claim against Gallagher, and Black's 
claim against Allstate was ripe for adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
When Allstate was faced with opposing claims against 
the two policies it had issued to the two parties involved in the 
accident giving rise to this lawsuit — Black and Gallagher — it 
decided to adjust both claims together, in spite of the obvious 
conflict of interest. Appellant Black believes it will be readily 
apparent that Allstate took this course of action for the sole 
reason that, by doing so, it could save Allstate a few thousand 
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dollars. Allstate then determined, contrary to both the law and 
common sense, that the accident was primarily the fault of Black, 
who was lawfully within the intersection doing what he was 
supposed to do, instead of Gallagher, who was unlawfully in the 
intersection after running a red light. 
Black was forced to filed suit, his claim against 
Allstate clearly alleging Allstate breached its contract with 
Black, specifically its duty to defend Black against the 
Gallagher claim and its duty to act fairly and in good faith. 
Allstate defended itself by mischaracterizing Black's claim as an 
impermissible third-party claim against the Gallagher policy, and 
by arguing erroneously that the claim was barred by Black's own 
policy language. Apparently Allstate believes that the duties and 
obligations set out in the Black policy apply to Black but not to 
Allstate. 
The trial court clearly erred in granting Allstate's 
summary judgment motion and denying that of Black, and this Court 
should reverse the trial court's decisions relating to the Black 
vs. Allstate claim, and remand it to the trial court for further 
discovery and trial on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jgf - day of March, 2003. 
^ ^ - / ? ; ^ 
Eric P. Hartmah 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on April 3, 2000) 
3 THE COURT: No. 3, Black versus Gallagher, et cetera. 
4 This is case No. C-983344. Counsel, state your appearances for 
5 the record. 
6 MR. NELSON: Chris Nelson for Allstate, your Honor. 
7 MR. HARTMAN: Eric Hartman on behalf of Chris Black. 
8 MR. HARDCASTLE: Lloyd Hardcastle on behalf of Shirl 
9 Gallagher. 
10 THE COURT: Very well. This is Allstate's motion for 
11 summary judgment. Mr. Nelson, you may proceed. 
12 MR. NELSON: Thank you, your Honor. I think this 
13 is a very straightforward matter. The plaintiff and Shirl 
14 Gallagher are both Allstate insureds under different policies. 
15 The plaintiff and Mr. Gallagher were involved in an automobile 
16 accident on April 12th, 1996. In that accident plaintiff claims 
17 to have sustained about $3,800 worth of property damage to his 
18 vehicle. 
19 The plaintiff brought action not only against 
20 Mr. Gallagher for the negligence of the — arising from the 
21 accident, but also against Allstate directly. Plaintiff has 
22 asserted that because — I think because Mr. Gallagher was 
23 negligent in the accident, Allstate, Mr. Gallagher's insurance 
24 company, is responsible directly to Plaintiff to pay his claim. 
25 The plaintiff claims additionally that there's bad 
-3-
1 faith because he is also an Allstate insured, even though, 
2 your Honor, the negligence and the issue of liability is 
3 Mr. Gallagher's liability. We filed this motion asserting 
4 that under Utah law — and I think Utah law is clear on this — 
5 the plaintiff cannot sue Allstate directly on the insurance 
6 policy of another person. That's a third-party claim, and 
7 there's no basis for that kind of an action. 
8 In our reply memoranda, your Honor, I refer to 
9 a case, Sperry versus Sperry. It's a case that the Utah 
10 Supreme Court resolved in October of last year, 1999, where 
11 the Court determined whether in a situation very similar to 
12 the one we have here, whether the claimant was a third-party 
13 claimant or a first-party claimant. 
14 In that case, your Honor, the plaintiff filed a claim 
15 with her insurance company against her own husband for the 
16 wrongful death of her son. Her husband and her — and she were 
17 both insureds of AMCO Insurance Company. The insurance company 
18 refused to settle her claim for the wrongful death action, and 
19 so she brought a claim for wrongful — or for bad faith against 
20 I the insurance company. 
21 The Utah Supreme Court said that in that situation she 
22 must be considered a third-party claimant, not a first-party 
23 claimant, and the Court affirmed the trial Court's dismissal of 
24 the bad faith action that she brought against her own insurance 
25 company. 
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1 That's the same situation we have here, your Honor. 
2 Plaintiff is merely a third-party claimant against Allstate, 
3 and he can't pursue these claims directly against Allstate. 
4 His remedy, your Honor, is to pursue the claim 
5 against Shirl Gallagher, and if he receives a judgment, then 
6 Mr. Gallagher, because of his relationship with Allstate, will 
7 resolve that judgment, again, if there happens to be one. So 
8 we believe, your Honor, that we're — Allstate is entitled to 
9 summary judgment. 
10 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Nelson. Thank you. 
11 Mr. Hartman, you may respond. 
12 MR. HARTMAN: I assume this is being taped? 
13 THE COURT: It indeed is. 
14 MR. HARTMAN: Okay. I'd like to preliminarily or once 
15 again raise my concern as to the apparent missing motions for 
16 partial summary judgment and to compel that appear to not be in 
17 the Court's file but which were filed. 
18 First of all, I'd like to say this being a motion 
19 for summary, all the allegations of the plaintiff are taken as 
20 true, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom are also 
21 indulged in favor of the plaintiff. 
22 I think what defendant Allstate is actually asking 
23 this Court to do is reform the complaint of plaintiff to 
24 simply allege a claim against Mr. Gallagher on Mr. Gallagher's 
25 liability policy. However, that's not what the plaintiff has 
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1 done here. 
2 If the Court finds the plaintiff's pleadings against 
3 Allstate are in some manner deficient, then the plaintiff 
4 would request an opportunity to amend those, because what 
5 we're dealing with here is plaintiff, Chris Black, suing his 
6 insurer, Allstate, for breach of contract, including the breach 
7 of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, in handling the 
8 I Gallagher claim against his policy, which is in fact a first-
9 party claim. 
10 Now, Allstate wants to have their cake and eat it, 
11 too. They have in this case a situation in which both parties 
12 to an auto accident were insured by Allstate. So instead of 
13 what a reasonable company would do — ship at least one of 
14 those claims out to some independent adjuster — Allstate goes 
15 ahead and adjusts both claims together, makes a determination 
16 and then sends it out and then wants to turn around and say 
17 that Allstate didn't owe any duties to anybody. 
18 What we're saying is Allstate can't have its cake and 
19 eat it, too, because when they are taking Gallagher's claim 
20 against the Black policy, they owe Chris Black certain duties 
21 which are alleged in plaintiff's complaint. They owe a duty of 
22 good faith and fair dealing. They owed a duty to defend. They 
23 owe — part of that duty to defend is a duty to reasonably 
24 investigate and perform an evaluation based on the facts that 
25 are presented to them. 
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1 I This is where the fallacy of defendant Allstate 
2 argument comes into play*is reflected in Plaintiff's motion 
3 for partial summary judgment, because under the facts as 
4 accepted by Allstate, as accepted by Allstate — and they 
5 have produced absolutely no facts to controvert the factual 
6 allegations of the plaintiff in his motion for partial summary 
7 judgment, absolutely none — under those facts as accepted by 
8 Allstate, it is Plaintiff's belief that Allstate's so-called 
9 liability determination in adjusting these opposing claims, was 
10 I erroneous as a matter of law. 
11 Now, as between Plaintiff and Gallagher, Mr. Gallagher 
12 may well want to continue his stance that in fact he did not 
13 run the red light, but Allstate has accepted the fact that in 
14 fact Mr. Gallagher did run the red light. Not only ran the red 
15 light, but ran it several seconds after it turned red. 
16 THE COURT: Doesn't — excuse me for interrupting. 
17 Doesn't there, though, have to be a final determination as to 
18 the liability question between Gallagher and Black before the 
19 question of bad faith refuses to settle under your theory of 
20 the law? 
21 MR. HARTMANr No, I don't — 
22 THE COURT: Ultimately? 
23 MR. HARTMAN: No, I don't think it does. 
24 THE COURT: And why? 
25 MR. HARTMAN: Well, for one — No. 1, because under the 
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1 particular facts of this case, there is no — there should be, 
2 in my view, a legal determination that in fact Allstate's 
3 liability decision was erroneous as a matter of law, because — 
4 I THE COURT: Well, how does that bear upon the issue of 
5 improper driving alleged against Mr. Gallagher? I mean, if — 
6 MR. HARTMAN: As between Plaintiff and Gallagher, it 
7 doesn't, because Gallagher — 
8 THE COURT: Then why is it that we're confusing the 
9 whole question of contract law and/or bad faith refusal to 
10 settle on the party plaintiff against its own carrier, with the 
11 issue of liability against Gallagher that's been pending since 
12 1996 for $3,800? Why are we confusing — 
13 MR. HARTMAN: Well, it hasn't been pending, according 
14 — I mean, Allstate — 
15 THE COURT: It hasn't happened, though. 
16 MR. HARTMAN: Allstate basically — has basically 
17 denied liability, but let me run through the facts of this 
18 case, your Honor. 
19 Gallagher — my client, Chris Black, was proceeding 
20 northbound on West Temple. He approached the intersection of 
21 3300 South, and he was going to take a left-hand turn. So he 
22 went into the left-hand turning lane, entered the intersection 
23 and stopped and waited. The light turned yellow. A couple of 
24 cars went through on the yellow light. Then the light turned 
25 red. 
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II As he took his foot of the brake, a car proceeded to 
2 run the red light directly in front of him. Then as he saw 
3 the cross traffic beginning to move on 3300 South, he again 
4 started to — what he was supposed to do — lawfully clear the 
5 intersection, when Mr. Gallagher's vehicle ran through the red 
6 light and smashed into him. 
7 Now, it is the statement of the sole eye witness that 
8 Mr. Black did what everybody else would have done under the 
9 circumstances. That Mr. Gallagher easily had time to stop, 
10 because the witness was driving right alongside of him. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. Well, what you're arguing to me here 
12 has to do with the liability question of Black v. Gallagher, 
13 but that's — 
14 MR. HARTMAN: As to Allstate's position. It doesn't. 
15 What it has to do with is the liability decision as Allstate 
16 looked at it, because, as I say, Gallagher may still claim that 
17 he did not in fact run the red light, even though Allstate 
18 clearly concluded that he in fact did run the red light. 
19 Here's the situation, your Honor. Both parties 
20 are insured by Allstate. Chris Black had only liability 
21 insurance. Shirl Gallagher had liability and collision 
22 insurance. Allstate looks at this claim, and low and behold 
23 years of training in adjusting insurance claims give them the 
24 ability to defy common sense and assert that the primary cause 
25 of the accident was in fact Chris Black's lawfully attempting 
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1 to complete his turn, as opposed to Shirl Gallagher's driving 
2 through the red light a few seconds after it had turned red. 
3 Allstate accepts those facts of the accident. 
4 What I'm saying is, based on Allstate's acceptance of 
5 those facts, their determination of — we are showing in our 
6 motion for partial summary judgment that their determination of 
7 liability is erroneous as a matter of law. 
8 THE COURT: And I'm not suggesting, Mr. Hartman, that 
9 your client doesn't have a claim against Allstate for bad faith 
10 either, but it seems to me that before one could reasonably 
11 accept an adverse party to accept one's view of the facts, 
12 there has to be a legal determination of what the facts are. 
13 MR. HARTMAN: But what we're saying, your Honor, is 
14 that as between the plaintiff and Allstate, there are no 
15 I disputes as to the facts of the accident. 
16 THE COURT: If this were a separate action, if you had 
17 the case of Black versus Allstate, Allstate would be in here 
18 arguing to me that I couldn't rule as a matter of law on the 
19 matter until the issue of Black versus Gallagher is resolved. 
20 Don't you think that might occur? 
21 MR. HARTMAN: No, I don't. 
22 THE COURT: Why? 
23 MR. HARTMAN: The point is, this is a first-party 
24 claim. There are various aspects of the claim. One is that 
25 they failed to defend. All cases say even though insurance 
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1 companies have given themselves in their boiler plate language 
2 the right to make such settlements and compromises as they deem 
3 I expedient to some degree — although that's not the language in 
4 this particular policy — all the cases that have addressed 
5 that have said this does not give them totally unfettered 
6 discretion to resolve these cases. In fact, all the cases say 
7 that they must do so on a reasonable evaluation of the facts, 
8 which are not in dispute, and they must do so in good faith. 
9 Now, part of our claim is that they have breached the 
10 contract in — that they had with Black to defend him and to 
11 deal with Gallagher's claim — 
12 THE COURT: Just a minute, defend Black? Black is the 
13 plaintiff. 
14 MR. HARTMAN: But as to Gallagher's claim, Black is in 
15 fact the defendant. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Well, in any event, Mr. Hartman, 
17 what I'm going to do, given the circumstance that your position 
18 is that you filed a number of pleadings that apparently didn't 
19 make it onto the docket, and you've now given me copies of 
20 those, I'm going to take the motion under advisement — 
21 MR. HARTMAN: May I — 
22 THE COURT: — and I'll notify you of my decision by 
23 (inaudible) ruling shortly. 
24 MR. HARTMAN: May I say just a few more brief things, 
25 your Honor? 
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1 THE COURT: Briefly, Mr. Hartman, I have evidentiary 
2 hearings at this time. 
3 MR. HARTMAN: I understand. What we're saying, your 
4 Honor, is that Allstate's position on this is apparently that 
5 they can make whatever determination in a first-party situation 
6 against their insureds that they feel like, and the insureds 
7 cannot sue them for breach of their contractual duties that are 
8 owed under the policy. 
9 THE COURT: Well, I appreciate that's your argument, 
10 and I'll accept that as your argument. We'll be in recess, 
11 Counsel. Thank you. 
12 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I just want to make sure 
13 you have my pleadings on Plaintiff's motion. Well, I think 
14 they're in the file. 
15 THE COURT: I have pleadings I will review in the file. 
16 MR. CHRISTENSEN: If it doesn't appear, will you please 
17 contact me and I can send you — 
18 MR. HARTMAN: Your Honor, may I — 
19 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I can also give you some more — 
20 MR. HARTMAN: I'm sorry, a reply memo was filed on 
21 Friday, and I don't know if you got that or not. 
22 THE COURT: I did get that. 
23 MR. HARTMAN: You did. Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel. 
25 (Hearing concluded.) 
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Civil No. 980913344 
vs. 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
SHJJRL GALLAGHER, an individual, and 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs Motion to Alter, Amend or Grant Relief from Judgment came before the 
court after receipt of plaintiff s Notice to Submit for Decision. After review of the relevant 
pleadings filed by the parties, the court finds: 
Plaintiff has already presented his arguments that he should be able to renew and 
maintain an action against Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"). He has also already asserted 
that Allstate's prior summary judgment was granted without prejudice and based solely on a lack 
of ripeness. This Court has entertained these arguments and rejected them. Furthermore, the 
prior motion for summary judgment granted in favor of Allstate was based upon well-established 
Utah law that as a third-party claimant, plaintiff cannot maintain a direct cause of action against 
Allstate. 
Accordingly, the Court hereby denies plaintiffs Motion to Alter, Amend or Grant 
Relief from Judgment. i 
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Judge Dennis Frederick 
On April 3, 2000, the court heard oral argument on Allstate Insurance Company's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and on plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Allstate 
was represented by Christian W. Nelson. Plaintiff was represented by Eric P. Hartman. Co-
defendant Shirl Gallagher was represented by Lloyd A. Hardcastle. After review of the pleadings 
presented by the parties on both of these motions, and after the presentation of oral argument, the 
court hereby grants Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment and denies plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
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